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In the same sense, and perhaps to the degree, that all men are political animals,
all men are consumers of the goods they produce. The tax directly premised upon the
economic act of consumption of goods is, in the light of modern distribution of
wealth, the tax most universally applicable and most burdensome. Although the
consumers' tax is, in general, meant to apply to each individual as he engages in the
act of consumption, administration of a consumers' tax is wholly unpalatable, and,
hence, not feasible or practical when the tax gatherers are required to hold each
consumer immediately responsible as the tax remitter. Minimum necessities of decent
public administration in consumer taxation require that the number of all persons
directly and immediately responsible to the tax agency be smaller than the number
of all the consumers who actually pay the tax or directly bear its burden. To assure
practical administration, the modern tax administrator must adjust tax gathering to
modern distribution methods in consumers' goods.
So it is found that, wherever possible in the realm of consumers' taxation, "retailers" are made tax collectors on behalf of the tax agency. The retailer is a hybrid
quasi-public official, bound under penalties of law to serve a public function in the
collection of tax, simultaneously serving two masters, his government and his profit.
A simple principle justifies this dual status to the tax administrator. In a typical state
there is one retailer to every 50 to ioo consumers; it is, therefore, cheaper and easier
to deal with the retailer. Even in such states as Illinois, where the consumers' tax is
technically a "retailers' occupation tax," and the retailer is technically the "taxpayer,"
the retailer is actually a collector.' Whatever the legal theory, the retailer is, from
*Ph.B., 1929, JJD., 1931, University of Chicago. Member, Illinois Bar. Formerly Supervisor, Division
of Rules and Regulations, Department of Finance,.State of Illinois; formerly Assistant Attorney General,
State of Illinois. Frequent contributor to legal and social science journals.
'I11. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (rev. Oct. 1, '939), issued by the Department of Finance of the
State of Illinois, distinguishes in Article 2o between the actual and the seeming as follows: (z) "The
Retailers' Occupation Tax Act imposes upon retailers [that is, persons engaged in the business of selling
tangible personal property to users or consumers) the duty of paying the State a tax at the rate of three
per cent of the gross receipts from their business." (2) "[The Retailers' Occupation Tax Act] does not
impose a tax upon the consumer." (3) ". . . but nothing contained in the [Retailers' Occupation Tax]
Act prohibits a retailer, in fixing the price of his merchandise, from setting up as a separate item the
amount of tax to be paid by him, provided that such separate item is identified as a part of the selling
price." (4) "The retailer shall not, in any event represent to his customers that he is acting as an agent
for the State in collecting a tax from them."
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the point of view of the tax administrator, in essence a collector because he so
considers himself.2
The anomalous quasi-public capacity of the retailer as either public or private tax
collector stimulates conflicts between his public duties, enforced by statutory penalties,
and his own self-interests as a competitor attempting to achieve competitive advantages over other retailers. Administrative definitions of what or who are taxable
must consider at all times the role of the retailer in the tax-gathering process and,
whatever the legal framework, specific definitions must be adjusted to the feasibility
of actual collection by a retailer in specific circumstances. Statutory definitions of the
"taxable transaction" or "taxable event" in consumers' taxes are characterized by
limited enumeration and broad scope, affording to the tax administrator ample scope
for interstitial policy-making. Administrative ruling attempting specific definition to
achieve the Nirvana of tax administration-complete certainty and acceptance of tax
liability by tax collectors and the taxpaying public-shifts, as a process, from legal
semantics to economic policy-making. The technique of definition in these circumstances is neither wholly law nor entirely economics; it is a delicate and sometimes
explosive mixture of both. These are the broadest of principles underlying the
administrative process in consumers' tax definition.
In a tax as immediate and as pervasive as a general consumer's tax, definition of
what is taxable must coincide, so far as rational, with the predisposition to functional
classification prevalent among business men prior to enactment of the tax. Administrative definition cannot in too many instances risk running counter to industrial,
retailing, or consuming views as to who is a consumer. Merely legalistic construction
of statutory language without weighty regard to public functional experience or
psychology adds cumulative irritant to the basic irritant of the consumers' tax itself
and by a Gresham's law of litigation results in almost proportional resort to the
courts by outraged taxpayers. The disposition of lower courts to invoke lay attitudes
in deciding definitional issues in consumers' taxation is notorious and has plagued
tax administrators everywhere.3 In part this is due to a lack of judicial expertness
in this field, in part to a judicial sensitivity to public attitudes toward administration
of the unpopular and regressive general consumers' tax. It is axiomatic, therefore,
that the excellent tax administrator will excel in the making of tax policy through
definitions, laying stress on legalisms only as administrative strategy necessitates a
practical prejudgment of what the courts in his state may be expected to do. His
excellence, however, will not be tested by the astuteness of his legal formulation as
much as by his ability to overcome, within the technical range of the statute, the
stresses and strains in public psychology and confidence created by the general
consumers' tax.
' Problems of state consumption tax collection and enforcement, including the basic matter here referred

to, are canvassed in Huston and Berryman, Collection and Enforcement of State Consumption Excise
Taxes, supra this issue.
' A general analysis of judicial interpretation of the taxable transaction for consumption taxation is to
be found in Cohen, The Taxable Transaction in Consumers' Taxes, infr this issue.
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That there is a technical ambit within which specific definition must stay is,
of course, elementary. Apart from the social implications of consumer taxation,
and the sensitivity of the public to administrative extension or retrenchment by
definition, it is a statute that must be construed. In Illinois, under the Retailers'
Occupation Tax Act, the economic activities by which men live and accumulate
wealth must be tested and taxed by the words: "Any transfer of the ownership of,
or tide to, tangible personal property to the purchaser, for use or consumption and
not for resale in any form as tangible personal property, for a valuable consideration ....-4 The tax (3%, 2% after June 30, 1941) is imposed on persons "engaged
in the business of selling tangible personal property at retail . . ." measured by gross
receipts from such sales. 5 ". . for use or consumption and not for resale in any
form as tangible personal property" are the basic words around which Illinois consumers' tax policy must be fashioned.
The quest for certainty is nowhere more exacting than where a taxpayer doubts
that his own business activities come within the ambit of a sales, occupation, or
other consumers' tax. Tax liability, in the context of retailing, has an important
impact on normal competition. Most retailers suffer an occupational urgency to
prevail upon the tax administrator that he treat all unusual facts as borderline, and,
hence, doubtful, applying all doubts in favor of the retailer and his non-responsibility or non-liability. Characteristically, this urgency is implemented by another
occupational urgency; no administrative tax definition is a sound definition which
does not include or exclude within the range of tax liability the entire competitive
context: that no competitive advantage be afforded, directly or indirectly, by administrative ruling. This concept of competitive advantage or disadvantage is not the
same as, nor can it always be tested by, the ordinary legal principles guiding a determination of what constitutes "discrimination." The motif of individual or trade
association argument when administrative tax definition is in course of formulation
may be paraphrased as follows: "We deny that your classification is correct, but if
you call a trade classification of retailers 'A.' it is far worse that some members of
A are ruled to incur tax liability and others not, than that all members of A are
improperly ruled to incur tax liability." Given the practice by all members of A
of tax shifting to their customers, the attack upon the tax administrator for improperly defining the whole category as taxable is of relatively minor consequence.
In such circumstances the challenge of definition is legalistic, technical, carried on
professionally, and often with due regard to whether tax monies are paid in escrow
and whether successful litigation will result in the retention of such monies by the
retailers themselves or in its return to those from whom the retailers have already
collected a tax. But where definition purports to, but does not realistically define
all members of A in terms of their mutual competitive interrelationship, tax admin1

24 ILL. STAT. ANN. (Jones, 1940) §119.450 (definition of
Id. §119.451.

"sale
at retail").

TAXABLE TRANSACTION: ADMINISTRATIVE DEFINITION

525

istration commences to disintegrate in the face of a multiform attack which transcends
the merely legal. The technique of administrative definition, to be successful, must
be premised upon the most careful fact-finding as to the functional characteristics of
those who exercise the taxable function or discharge the taxable event. It is basically
a problem for those tax-policy-makers who can expertise in the peripheral aspects
of the legal definition itself, in the economics of competition and consumption, in
the permutations of public and group psychology generated by a regressive tax upon
day-to-day living.
A basic problem in administrative tax definition happens to be the first problem
in point of time. Should an agency administering a consumers' tax state, in detail
and in advance, its views as to who are and who are not taxable, what is and what
is not taxable? Or should the tax agency require the taxpayer to determine his own
tax liability by consulting the statute and/or legal counsel, the agency reserving the
right to agree or disagree with him after examining his tax return? To what extent
and to what degree should the tax agency publicly define tax liability in advance of
court adjudication? These questions necessitate some consideration of the rulemaking function, normally given to the tax agency by the statute, which constitutes
its legal justification to promulgate definitions.
Under the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act "the Department [of Finance]
is authorized to make, promulgate, and enforce such reasonable rules and regulations
relating to the administration and enforcement of the provisions of this Act as may
be deemed expedient." 6 The Department of Finance deemed it expedient to promulgate nearly ioo "rules" relating to particular trades, professions, businesses and conditions affected by the act. Extensive circulation of these rules affords to Illinois
taxpayers formal definitions as to specific tax liability. Selection of the subject to be
specifically defined was, in general, determined by two distinct methods: (i) within
a relatively short time after the enactment of the tax, those taxpayers who urgently
pressed upon the tax administrators the contention that they were not subject to the
tax obtained, owing to the sheer pressure of the economic burden exerted by
customers who resisted the tax collection, a formal ruling containing a definition
either including or excluding all similar retailers from the scope of the tax; (2) taxpayers who sought resort to the courts and obtained judicial rulings settling definitional issues in their favor, as opposed to the views of the tax administrator, obtained,
as a matter of course, formal rulings promulgated by the tax administrator embodying
the contrary position of the courts.
The impact of judicial action upon the administrative process of definition
periodically results in revision of promulgated rulings to adjust other definitions to
the rationale of the determinations reached in the courts. Hence in an examination
of the publicly promulgated definitions of an agency administering a consumers' tax
it surprises no sophisticated student of consumption taxation to note the prominence
given to apparently trivial definitional formulations of tax liability, such as those
1d. §119.464.
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concerning picture framers, 7 monument vendors,' pest exterminators, blacksmiths,1 0
and the like. There is no necessary relationship between the amount of tax forthcoming from any taxpayer group and the need for publicly formulating a definition
of liability. Where adequately conceived and formulated, such single definitions
serve as constituent elements in a pattern of definition whereby administrative and
taxpayer determination of who or what are taxable can be made by analogy and with
due regard to rational consistency. It is conceivable, for example, that a definition
formulated as to shoe or harness repairmen," whose total tax liability, in the fiscal
picture of the state, may be relatively insignificant, may in so far as the definition
can be defended from attack, control, or have an important bearing upon, the theory
of tax liability of building contractors 12 from whom the total tax due may be of
major fiscal importance.
But the administrative technique of definition is not confined merely to formal
promulgation of definitions under the rule-making power. In a state as important
commercially as Illinois, the process of administrative definition is continuous and
never-ending. Although formal definition may be shaped in terms of occupational
grouping, individual taxpayers continuously solicit rulings as to their liability. Consistency is here the watchword. In the interests of tax policy, and without necessary
regard to the opinions of the lower courts, individual rulings, upon the solicitation of
individual taxpayers, must be consistent with the definitional formulations which
have been publicly promulgated.
The alternative administrative procedure thus suggested raises the question
whether it is more desirable to minimize the number of publicly promulgated
definitions, and thereby maximize the number of individual solicitations of rulings
by taxpayers, or better to elaborate the pattern of publicly promulgated general
definitions. The philosophy of tax administration under the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act has been to choose the latter policy, since definition has been
considered to be not only a method for resolving the initial doubts of the taxpayer as
to his tax liability, but one also for stabilizing and controlling the tax assessment
procedure within the Department of Finance. The most important function of
administrative tax definition is its controlling force upon the internal structure of
the tax agency-investigation, auditing, tax assessments, penalties, hearings. Administrative tax definition may be merely educational as it applies to the taxpayer, but,
in Illinois, it is mandatory and furnishes a generative force within the tax agency
for the making and enforcement of tax assessments.
Here it is necessary to contrast the judicial and administrative views as to the
significance of administrative tax definition and its binding effect. Despite the fact
that the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax Act confers upon the Department of
Finance, as has been seen, the power to "make reasonable rules and regulations," an
'III. Ret. Occ. Tax Rules and Reg. (1939) Rule 47.
'Id. Rule No. 42.
'Id. Rule No. 8o.
'Id. Rule No. 48.
" Id. Rule No. 13.
"Id. Rule No. 6.
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administrative definition affirmatively providing for tax liability is not considered
binding by most Illinois courts. The lower courts are prone to insist upon an untrammeled judicial prerogative of applying the facts of a case de novo to the language
of the statute and arriving at independent formulations of tax liability where definitional issues are raised. The extent to which they will give binding effect to the

definition of tax liability varies with the degree to which the court can exercise an
expert judgment and to the extent that the court will respect the ability of the

administrative officials. But definitions formulated administratively do not always
affirmatively pronounce the defined occupation or event to be taxable. Several of
these definitions hold that the administrative agency does not consider the defined
event or occupation taxable. Whatever the views of the courts as to the affirmative
formulation of taxability, there can be no question as to the binding effect of negative
formulations of non-taxability. It is dear, as practical tax administration goes, that if
the administrative agency formulates, by definition, a rule of non-taxability, those
affected will not seek recourse to the courts to have their immunity overthrown.
Since, as has been seen, administrative tax definition is mandatory internally within
the tax agency, the negative definition is the outstanding responsibility of the tax
administrator in consumers' taxation. The basic, ultimate and controlling function
of administrative definition in Illinois is to state who are not, not who are, taxable.
In Illinois, as in most consumers' tax jurisdictions, the general consumers' tax
was enacted in the midst of the last great depression as an emergency measure. For
eight years, the Illinois Retailers' Occupation Tax, now seemingly a permanent and
integral part of the state fiscal structure, has been administered with continuous
regard to taxpayer acceptance of the tax. Definitions of taxability and non-taxability
have been meticulously drafted to assure that major end. Rules embodying definitions,
negative and affirmative, have accreted over eight years, as policy has unfolded and
supreme court opinions have come down, into an elaborate pattern. And while, in
legal effect, the consistency of two rules is not controlling as to the validity of either,
consistency of all rules which, by definition, arrive at non-taxability, is a basic necessity in assuring taxpayer acceptance of continuation of this form of tax. Pertinent,
therefore, is the inquiry as to whether this consistency has been achieved, and if so,
how the Department of Finance has effected the feat in applying definitions to over
157,oo retailers in Illinois.

In general, the Department has premised taxability and non-taxability alike on
the distinction between (i) the occupation of engaging in the business of selling
tangible personal property to users or consumers in Illinois and (2) the occupation
of engaging in the business of rendering services in Illinois, recognizing that where
services are rendered qua services or in conjunction with sales of tangible personal
property, there are five logical possibilities. Either a person (a) renders service and
nothing else (non-taxable), or (b) sells tangible personal property and nothing else
(taxable), or (c) renders services and in rendering them incidentally transfers tangible
personal property, or (d) sells tangible personal property and incidentally renders
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services, or (e) sells tangible personal property and renders services, both items
constituting a substantial portion of the transaction. Illustratively, in reconciling to
Illinois taxpayers its rulings on definitional issues under (c), (d) and (e), the
Department has taken the following positions:
All persons or institutions engaged in the business of rendering services, who in
the rendition of such services transfer no tangible personal property, or who transfer
quantities of personal property which are entirely incidental to the nature of the
services rendered, or inconsequential in relation to the value of the services rendered,
do not incur tax liability under the act because not engaged in selling 1 8
When a person is engaged in the business of selling tangible personal property at
retail and incidentally renders services in connection therewith, the total receipts are
within the measure of the Retailers' Occupation Tax Act. Whether the service is
incidental or not depends upon the nature of the business involved and the character
14
of the commodity sold.
All persons engaged in the business of rendering services who, in the rendition
of such services, transfer a substantial or considerable quantity of tangible personal
property are required to keep books, segregating receipts realized from services performed and those derived from the sale of such tangible personal property. Such
persons incur tax liability measured by the gross receipts realized from the sale at
retail of tangible personal property.' 5
Under these major conceptual formulations, there are, of course, subsumed the
various propositions, which, in Illinois, are of necessity stated in terms of the "occupation" of the seller and which, in other consumers' tax jurisdictions, take the direct
form of formal, definitional distinction between "sale" on the one hand and "fabrication," "lease," "rental," "license for use or consumption," etc.
Since the nature of the activity of the seller of tangible personal property is the
touchstone of taxability in Illinois, questions as to the nature of a "sale," the nature
" Rendition of services: electrotypers, stereotypers and matrix makers (Rule No. 20); paper cutters
(Rule No. 27); furniture and storage warehousemen (Rule No. 29); public amusement places (Rule No.
56); operators of hotels, boarding and rooming houses (Rule No. 84). Rendering of services and transference of personal property incidental to the nature of the services performed: correspondence schools
(Rule No. I7); optometrists, oculists, opticians (Rule No. 32); hospitals, infirmaries, sanitaria (Rule
No. 34); physicians and surgeons (Rule No. 52); dentists and dental laboratories (Rule No. 57);
veterinarians (Rule No. 79); schools, fraternities, and sororities which operate cafeterias or restaurants for
their membership (Rules No. 74, 68 and 7). Rendering services but also transferring a quantity of
tangible personal property inconsequential in relation to the value of the services rendered: operators of
barber and beauty shops (R,;le No. ix); book binders (Rule No. 27); watch and jewelry repairmen (Rule
No. 22); automobile chassis lubricators (Rule No. 3); tire and tube repairmen (Rule No. 43); automobile
refinishers and painters (Rules No. 69 and 92); title abstractors (Rule No. 72); hatcheries (Rule No. 73);
pest exterminators (Rule No. 80); public stenographers (Rule No. 83); advertising agencies (Rule No.
86); photostaters, blue printers, photo-finishers (Rule No. 87); pattern makers (Rule No. 93).
"'Incidental services: newspaper, magazine and periodical publishers (Rule No. 2); contractors who
sell and install fixtures (Rule No. 6); restaurants and other eating places (Rule No. 7); pharmacists and
druggists (Rule No. 12); tangible personal property made to order (Rule No. 30); memorial stone and
monument makers (Rule No. 42); florists and nurserymen (Rule No. 77).
" Funeral directors and undertakers (Rule No. 8); automobile repair shops and garages (Rule No.
so); shoe or harness repairmen (Rule No. 13); tire retreaders (Rule No. 43); picture framers, except

where the picture is installed in the customer's frame (Rule No. 47); blacksmiths (Rule No. 48); fur and
garment repairers (Rule No. 53); furniture repairmen and upholsterers (Rule No. 54).
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of "fabrication," the nature of a "lease," etc., must be recast into functional evaluation
of the recipient of "receipts," ie., is such recipient a "seller" of tangible personal
property at retail?:" And since there would be no need for administrative evaluation,
were there no tangible personal property transferred by the recipient of receipts, inclusion and exclusion is here, as almost everywhere, a question of degree. Were the
administrative purpose given full effect in Illinois, it could be stated as follows:
"Use or consumption," in addition to its usual and popular meaning, includes the
employment by a person engaged in a service occupation, trade or profession, of tangible
personal property in the rendering of his services where, as a necessary incident to the
rendering of the service, transfer of all or of part of such tangible personal property is
made from the person engaged in the service occupation, trade or profession to his customer and client. Any transfer for a consideration of property not necessary to the rendering
of a service is not a "use"' by the person engaged in a service occupation, but constitutes
a sale at retail. "Use or consumption" also includes any disposition not for a valuable
consideration of tangible personal property from one person to another.
But to offset the breadth of the formulation, there is the following caveat:
"Use or consumption" shall not include any transformation, conversion, or alteration
of tangible personal property in the course of a process of production whereby the tangible
personal property becomes in any form part of an article which will be the subject of a
"sale at retail" either by the manufacturer or by a subsequent transferee of such manufacturer.
These propositions, and others, are appeals to reason, amelioratives of rational
consistency. Fundamentally, no tax is as bad as an unmitigated general consumers'
tax; fundamentally, no other tax requires so greatly the tempering of the administrative process.
10

This, of course, is not true of necessary distinctions to be drawn between "personalty" and "realty."

In determining what is "tangible personal property" no specialized orientation of definition is requisite in
Illinois. Thus Article x5 (the administrative definition of "tangible personal property") epitomizes the
conventional. Inter alia, "the term 'tangible personal property' embraces all goods, wares, merchandise
and commodities . . . real property consists of land and improvements to land, such as permanent
buildings and all appurtenances thereto and parts thereof." The problem here ig in a strict legal context.

